The Amazing USS Zumwalt

The most modern of warships, USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) probably the most

revolutionary advancement in naval ships since the USS Nautilus (SSN-571).

I realize this is an expensive platform, but in a nutshell as stated in the following comentary, 

decision may have been penny wise and pound foolish, as it leaves significant voids in the Navy’s ability to adapt to future threats. Most notably, ending the Zumwalt program in favor of buying upgraded versions of the decades-old Arleigh-Burke DDG-51 destroyers limits the Navy’s capabilities without significantly reducing costs.

Only three DDG-1000 are to be built. I expect, hope this decision to be reversed. Won't be overnight, a few years down the road.

Cancelling the DDG-1000 Was a Big Mistake
by Ben Freeman
January 2015

The U.S. Navy’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers are extraordinarily expensive. Since

2009, the cost of the ships has increased 34.4 percent, according to the Congressional Research Service. Each of the three Zumwalt’s being built will cost taxpayers around $3.4 billion. And, that’s on top of the more than $9 billion in research and design funding that has gone into this program.

Are they worth the price? The Navy didn’t think so in 2009 when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the program would end with the procurement of just three ships, down from the 32 ships the Navy had initially planned to buy.

But, now that the first Zumwalt is actually in the water, there’s growing concern that this decision may have been penny wise and pound foolish, as it leaves significant voids in the Navy’s ability to adapt to future threats.


The problem with using DDG-51s in lieu of DDG-1000s is that they are “ill-suited to providing defensive cover for LCS or helping the Navy conduct operations in a coastal environment,” says Young. 

Thus, it’s not at all clear how LCS will be able to safely operate in littoral waters given that, alone, it’s “not expected to be survivable in high-intensity combat,” according to J. Michael Gilmore, Defense Department director of operational test and evaluation.

All of these comparisons between DDG-51s and DDG-1000s belie the fact that the ships should not be competitors; they serve different, but complementary roles that are both essential for the future of the U.S. Navy. Fortunately, it’s not too late for Congress to act — the DDG-1000 production line is still hot. If we’re serious about having a Navy that can adapt to the threats of tomorrow, then we need to get serious about DDG-1000’s today. 

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